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What sets humans apart from all other creatures? If you were to approach a biological Homo sapiens with the
question “what makes you human?” how would they respond? Do we have value simply as humans, or are we
nothing more than what we offer the world? Philosophers have discussed these questions for centuries and it
seems that there have been a few concrete conclusions. These conclusions depend on how one views ethical
theory.
Ethical theory and personhood go hand-in-hand. Immanuel Kant, one of the greatest philosophers of the 18th
Century, developed his moral philosophy in what is now known as Kantian Ethics. Using this viewpoint, we
can argue that Kant’s opinion about personhood is more in line with an ontological perspective, based on
three things: his idea of reason and human knowledge, an emphasis on moral duty, and the Humanity
Formula.
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hat sets humans apart from all other creatures? If you were to approach a biological 
Homo sapiens with the question “what makes you human?” how would they respond? 
Do we have value simply as humans, or are we nothing more than what we offer the 
world? Philosophers have discussed these questions for centuries and it seems that there have 
been a few concrete conclusions. These conclusions depend on how one views ethical theory. 
 
Ethical theory and personhood go hand-in-hand. Immanuel Kant, one of the greatest 
philosophers of the 18th Century, developed his moral philosophy in what is now known as 
Kantian Ethics. Using this viewpoint, we can argue that Kant’s opinion about personhood is 
more in line with an ontological perspective, based on three things: his idea of reason and human 
knowledge, an emphasis on moral duty, and the Humanity Formula. 
 
Before diving into Kant’s philosophy, we first must understand both sides of the personhood 
debate. Generally speaking, there are two main philosophical viewpoints on human personhood. 
The first is Empirical Functionalism. This viewpoint defines human personhood as “a set of 
functions or abilities” (Sullivan, 2003). Many philosophers have broken these functions down 
into a list of what makes a human a person. This may list include such ideas as self- awareness, 
higher brain functions, and the ability to relate to others. Simply put, empirical functionalism 
reduces human value to the sum of a human’s parts, and what abilities they offer the world. One 
of the many problems with this viewpoint is that it denies personhood to anyone who does not 
contain these qualities at all moments of life. This means that people sleeping, infants, the 
elderly, and those with a mental illness might not be considered persons, based on these 
particular circumstances. 
 
The flip side of this debate is called Ontological Personalism. “Ontological Personalism states 
that all human beings are human persons” (Sullivan, 2003). By a human’s very nature, they are a 
person. Personhood does not depend on what one can or cannot do; all that matters is that one is 
a biological human being. 
 
Kant’s opinions on the world and how it works are confusing. Yet his insights on reason and 
human knowledge lead us to believe that he views humans as having intrinsic value. Kant 
believes in transcendental idealism. This means that, “in this world, we do perceive things, but 
we can only perceive them the way our senses are made. The inputs we get are organized by our 
senses and our mental faculties and thereby we create the objects we see out in the world” (as 
cited in Gilgen, 2005). In Kant’s opinion, there are two worlds. The first world is the real world, 
known as the noumenal world. The second world is the world we perceive, called the 
phenomenal world. We are influenced both by the noumenal and phenomenal world. 
 
Simply put, we create what is in front of us: We make the world. Kant’s view of the world puts 
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great emphasis on human opinion and perception. This follows an ontological perception rather 
than an empirical perception on whether a human is a person, because it does not say that 
humans must have certain traits. In fact, it does not say that humans have to have the same 
phenomenal world at all. This idea cannot be empirical functionalism, because not everyone sees 
the world the same way. On this viewpoint, what makes us persons is the value of each 
perception, and Kant says we all have common ground. 
 
With that background in mind, let’s look at what has become known as Kantian Ethics. This is 
grounded in the idea of moral duty, which has two meanings. First, “there is no conceivable 
circumstance in which we regard our own moral goodness as worth forfeiting simply in order to 
obtain some desirable object” (Johnson, 2008). Second, everything else is worthless without 
moral goodness. So how do we determine if an act is in line with our moral goodness? 
 
For Kant, the basic principle is the Categorical Imperative (CI), a command with no exceptions, 
to “act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a 
universal law” (Wilkens, 1995). In other words, only do an action if you can generalize it for 
everyone. In regards to personhood, the CI eliminates the possibility of having an empirical 
perspective. 
 
As an example, consider someone in a coma. Would one consider him to be a non-person simply 
because he is not self-aware? To generalize this rule, one would have to say that everyone who 
is sleeping is also a non-person, because they are not self-aware. One cannot generalize this rule 
for everyone based on this example and still have it be true; therefore it is not a moral act. From 
the ontological viewpoint, Kantian Ethics seems to support the idea that all humans are persons 
as members of the human race. If a biological Homo sapiens is a person, that means that all 
Homo sapiens are persons. 
 
The most compelling argument for Kantian Ethics in support of ontological personalism is 
Kant’s Humanity Formula. This CI says one is to “act in such a way that you always treat 
humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, 
but always at the same time as an end” (Wilkins, 1995). “This is often seen as introducing the 
idea of „respect‟ for persons, for whatever it is that is essential to our humanity” (Johnson, 
2008). This formula gives humans inherent value. Each individual is valued, not on what they 
can do, but on that fact that they are persons. Treating them as means to an end does not give 
them the individual freedom they deserve. Treating them as an end in itself looks at what would 
be best for that person. 
 
Kant and his ethical theory are grounded in moral duty and human value. With the emphasis on 
individuals and respect, Kantian ethics agrees more with the ontological personalist view of 
personhood, rather than the empirical functionalist view. Kant and his followers would argue 
that humans are not equal to the sum of their parts, but rather are valued because they are 
humans. 
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